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During the past four decades finaric.ial markets in.the U.S. 
have generally rece:i,ved high marks for the way they served 
farmers and rural nonfarm businesses. 11 A large number of 
commercial banks, credit cooperatives, Farmers' Home Adminis-
tration offices, savings and loan associations,. and life insur-
ance companies provide dependable and accessible financia-1 ser--
vices in most rural areas. The Cooperative Farm Credit System 
alone has become a huge borrower in the U.S., second only in 
size to the Federal Government. Despite this overall success, 
some recent criticism has been aimed at activities in U.S. 
rural financial markets (RFMs). A recent television prograrrt 
questioned the propriety of Farmers' Home Administration 
granting cheap loans to large landowners in Southern California, 
and the Government Accounting Office recently criticized where 
and to whom some Federal Land Banks are making sizable loans. 
Some observers have also questf.oned the role that financial 
markets and tax.laws play in helping large farmers and 
* In this paper I have borrowed a number of ideas from my col-
legues Compton Bourne, Douglas Graham, Warren. Lee and Robert 
Vogel. 
1/ We should remember that these recent successes were preceded 
- by a good deal of turmoil. U.S. history includes a number of 
attempts to improve financial services in rural area~ that 
failed (Hammond). The .two versibns o"f the Bank o.f the United 
States, and hundreds of corporations, private banks and-state 
:!<---., banks that failed in their attempts to provide financial ser-
vices in rural areas are grim reminders that a stable system 
does not come automatically. 
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corporations acquire more land on credit. The well-to-do 
find it easy to obtain formal loans because they have ample 
collateral, and tax laws allow those with high income to 
write off a substantial portion of their interest payment 
against income taxes. There has also been some recent dis-
cussion about credit quotas aimed at directing loans to high 
priority groups. 
Despite these recent problems, many low income 
countries have tried to emulate, through institutional trans-
plants, U.S. RFMs. These include formation of cooperative 
credit institutions similar to Production Credit Associations, 
supervised credit programs modeled after Farmers' Home Admin-
istration, rural private ban'ks like those found in the Midwest, 
g.overnment lending agencies similar to the Small Business Ad,... 
ministration, and credit unions along the lines of those 
formed in North America. Thousands of technicians and policy-
makers from.low income countries have come to the U.S. to 
study our financial system. As a result of their visits, re-
inforced by U.S. credit technicians and foreign assistance 
programs, many of the policies used in RFMs around the world 
are close cousins to policies used in the U.S. 
Despite these institutional and policy transfers, many people 
are very unsatisfied with the performance of RFMs in low income 
countries. Even with large increases in the number of institu-
tions providing financial services in rural areas and very large 
increases in the funds available for rural lending, small business 
I· 
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and ~he rural poor 6ontinue to have little access to formal 
loans in mo€1t countries. They f.ind it even more difficult to 
find financial savings services, and to get loans that are 
medium or long term. Oyerall, financial markets strongly re-
sist lending to agriculture i"n general and even more strongly 
resists lending to those who do not have ample collateral. 
Some people have felt that the limited Sl1Ccess of RFMs 
in LICs was largely due to the need to tailor unique financial 
institutions for each country t.o service local financial needs. 
As a result, a number of countries have experimented with var-
ious forms of state ownership of banks, development banks for 
specific commodities, credit services closely integrated with 
area development programs, credit programs. tied to agrarian 
reform agencies, and lending to.informal groups. While some 
of these institutional innovations look promising for a time, 
most fail to give the results desired .. In the discussion 
that follows, I argue that two poorly understood factors are 
making it difficult to develop effective RFMs in LICs and 
tha~-these have relatively little to do with the institutional 
form in which financial services are provided. I also argue 
that careful analysis of problems in these RFMs can provide 
valuable _insights into difficulties that are appearing in 
less serious form in the U.S. (Sometime~ ·it is easier to 
diagnose problems wh,en they emerge in extreme form). While 
LICs may have learned a bit from us about institutional 
arrangements, we may be able to learn more from them about 
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the effects of policies that adversely affect the performance 
. -
of financial markets. By doing this we may be able to diag-
c, 
·nose and treat problems that. emerge in our RFMs before they 
become serious. 
Before discussing these problems in more detail it may 
be useful to briefly review the contributions that finance 
makes to economic activities and especially to economic 
-development. 
Role of Finance 
Financial intermediation is a simple process too often 
confused by moral judgments and political activities. It in-
volves the passing back and forth, through some third party, 
of contrac~s among individuals who want to exchange real re-
sources. These individuals do not want to go to the trouble 
of making contact with someone to effect the exchange in person. 
The fact that someone will do this intermediation allows an 
economy to realize a number of important benefits. Most im-
portantly, financial instruments allow savers a more diversi-
fied menu of ways to hold their surpluses. In a semi-sub-
sistence economy some households find they produce more in a 
given period than they prefer to consume. They may also find 
that the returns to alternative uses of their resources in 
other available production activities are unattractive. With-
out financial instruments these households have only two op-
·-!J 
tions: to consume more, or to invest their surpluses in some /-, 
,_/ 
low return producti6n activity. Neither of these options 
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provide the household with incentives to substantially increase 
future surpluses. 
In a semi-subsistence economy thefe may be firms or house-
holds that are prodycing too little to satisfy current consump-
· ... 
tion needs or to. capitalize on attractive investment aTternatives. 
These households may find it difficult to find additional real 
resources unless they are in close proximity to surplus house-
holds. Trading of land, labor and animal power is difficult 
if people are strangers and located far from each other. 
Financial intermediation allows surplus households to issue 
a claim on some of its real resources in the form of a savings 
deposit to someone who can more productively use these resources 
r\ and is willing to buy a saver's claim on real· resources by tak-
ing a loah from the intermediary. If the costs of financial 
' 
intermediation are modest, society gains through real resources 
being transfered from producers who realize low marginal re-
turns to producers who have higher returns at the margin. 
1Financial markets that are working properly allow for very 
substantial efficiency gains. 
Finance also allows households and firms to manage their 
risks in more acceptable ways. For the saver, liquid finan-
cial assets maybe a very important way of responding to un-
foreseen events. 
Most of us take' financial intermediation for granted. 
. ,•' . . . ' . '. 
We ignore how difficult it would be to carry out day-to-day 
economic activities without financial instruments. It would 
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be virtually impossible to buy airplane tickets, reimburse.hotel 
owners for their services, pay for our food, save for retirement, 
and make investment decisions, for ·example, without financial 
instruments. The reason Man invented and accepted financial 
instruments was that barter was a cumbersome, wasteful and in-
convenient way to make exchanges. How many of us would save 
parts of our production if the only way we could do SQ would 
be to store part of our output: wheat, potatoes, or economic 
advice? Many of us would find that our products would not 
store, or that saving in these forms would be. 'virtually im-
possible. 
Financial instruments are a marvelous invention that allow 
a large variety of heterogeneous commercial transactions to be 
carried out with minimum transaction costs. The reason that 
these instruments can do this is because they are highly 
fungible and divisible. The increased availability of finan-
cial instruments was a ma.j or factor that allowed increasingly 
complex commercial transactions to emerge the past several 
hundred years. Capitalist as .well as socialist economies 
owe a significant part of their growth to the inventions of 
money, deposits, and loans. One needs to do relatively little 
reading about frontier life during early. U.S. History to 
realize how shortages of financial instruments and an unstable 
financial system can severely limit real economic activities. 
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Performance of RFMs in LICs 
With .few exceptions, RFMs in low income countries are plagued 
with serious problems, some obvious and some obscure. A number 
of countries have very large loan repayment problems, for ex-
ample, with some government credit programs recovering less 
than half of the amount lent. These repayment problems blight 
the agencies involved, and absorb valuable management time. 
In most countries it is very difficult to get financial markets 
to service rural areas and especially the rural poor. In all 
too many cases the loans that do move through formal financial 
markets into rural areas are concentrated in the hands of the 
well-to-do. With rare exceptions, formal financial markets 
offer people in rural areas few financial savings opportun-
ities. Those institutions that do provide deposit facilities, 
often require large minimum balances, pay very low rates of 
interest, or make it difficult for savers to withdraw deposits. 
In cases where some rural savings are mobilized, a significant 
part of these funds are moved out of rural areas and relent 
in the cities. It is also very difficult for most rural entre-
preneurs to get formal loans that are longer in term than 
6 to 12 months. 
Despite very large investments in rural· credit activities 
by foreign aid agencies, many of the financial institutions 
serving rural areas are in weak financial shape. Management 
turnover is often rapid, and political intrusions into the 
system are common. The onslaughts of inflation, combined with 
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low interest rates and default often seriously erode the pur-
chasing po~er of the loan po~tfolios of these institutions. 
Reporting requirements forced on these lenders by local gov-
ernments .arid foreign aiq agencies often bury the agencies · 
in a blizzard of paperwork. I recently talked with the head 
of an agricultural bank in Latin America who was providing 
separate reports on thirty lines of credit within his agency 
to his government and outside aid agencies. None of these 
reports was useful for management decisions by the bank,or 
c 
the aid agencies. Lender procedures often cause borrowers 
to incur very large borrowing costs despite concessionary in-
terest rate policies. 
Reasons for Poor Performance 
Many people are confused over the reasons for the 
poor performance of financial markets. The reasons are often 
expressed in terms of institutional failures or individual 
shortcomings. It is easy to assign a credit cooperative failure 
by pointing a finger at management or members who are unwil-
ling to cooperate, for example. The quest for the unique in~ 
stitution manned by well intentioned managers to service the 
financial needs of rural people is seemingly endless in most 
countries. 
My feeling is that these problems are not due to the lack 
of appropriate institutions or lack of capable and honest 
management, or to the lack of people who will cooperate. The r\ 
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problems in RFMs around the world are too similar to be expl.ained 
by institutions and personalities. Rather, these problems are 
due to rural development policies and to the way ·financial 
markets have been used and abused by policymakers. 
RFM p_roble'ms are closely assbciated with ubiquitous low 
interest rate policie.s. These low and inflexible interest 
rates, when combined with inflation, result in negative real 
rates of interest being in force in most of the low income 
countries. These negative real rates of interest are a ~ax 
on all holders of financial assets, cause the purchasing 
power or loan portfolios to erode, and force·· 1enders to ration 
their services through non-market means. Lenders use non-
,0. market rationing because there is excess demand for loans at 
negative real~interest rates. Those who have stood in line 
recently to get student loans in the U.S., whirih carry conces-
sionary interest rates, understand how banks work this non-
market rationing system. With excess demand, the lender is 
very choosy about the people and f.irms that receive loans. 
Borrowers typically must have excellent collateral; provide a 
cosigner, and have an excellent loan repayment,track record. 
People who have done business with the lender previously re-
ceive more favorable considerations than new borrowers because 
it costs the bank less to gather information about repayment 
capacity for old borrowers. Those who find it incr~asingly 
difficult to obtain loans when the real rates of interest are 
low or negative include all of the rural poor, small and new 
-10-
businesses, those without secure and clear collateral, ·and those 
who have never borrowed from the lender before. 
In addition_to selecting borrowers more carefully, the 
lender exercises rationing power by increasing the borrower's· 
loan transaction costs. The lender cah make th~ borrower stand 
in long lines, treat the borrower with less dignity, and on 
occasion ask for an under-the-table-payment in order to recieve 
the loan. The lender may also increase the borrower's loan 
transaction costs by shifting some of the lender's normal. 
costs to the borrower. The lender can charge the borrower for 
loan application forms, add closing costs, and service fees, 
and require the borrower to pay for a technician to survey 
and approve the collateral offered for the loan. All of 
these techniques are used by lenders to increase the effective 
borrowing costs of those customers who are least profitable 
for the lender, without forcing the lender to refuse; outright, 
the loan application. 
When negative real rates of interest are in force and 
financial markets. are generally repressed, the financial,sys-
tern becomes much more vulnerable to political intrusions. 
Since it becomes much more difficult for the financial systems 
to mobil.ize voluntary financial savings, RFMs become more 
dependent on the central bank or the government for funds to 
maintain the purchasing power of loan portfolios. The poli-
tical system can.then force the financial system to march to 
political music by extending or withholding funds needed to 
·:£'::1.. 
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an 11th Century Danish ruler of England (Holin~hed, p .. 131> .. 
To demonstrate that even a King who controlled most of·5 
countries had limited powers; ·cnute commanded the .. tide not 
to continue in on the piece of' beach where he was sitting .. 
Despite his command the tide moved in and soaked the King .. 
While retreating f'rom the tide, Cnute pointed out to his nobles 
that, although the tides worked on part of bis :sovereign do-
main, they were beyond his control. He bad the good sense 
to retreat before the tide and publically acknowledged that, 
' while he could causes taxes and duties to rise and f'all, be 
had no influence on tides. T"ne laws of gravity had more com-
mand over water molecules than did the King. 
Those interest~d in rural financial markets ough.t to 
emulate the wisdom or Cnute and resist trying to duplicate 
the miracles of' Moses. Financial instruments are almost as 
liquid as water. The irresistable pull o:f pro:fits in. a market 
economy will cause those :financial instruments to f'low to ac-
tivities that give the user the most satisfaction. Because 
these instruments are as divisible as water they are vir-
tually impossible to control by fiats from the capital city; 
too many actors are involved in financial intermediation 
to be able to override the economic f'orces that propel the 
movement of this liquidity to its highest and best u.se.. As 
argued earlier, the redeeming, characteristic of finance is its 
fungibility. Its divisibility, its liquidity, its substitu-
tability for other activities, and the ability to divert this 
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liquidity into a wide range of' uses are the main reasons that 
Man invented these instruments.. As Cnute f'ound out, ~ater is 
wet, and to eliminate 'this desirable property of' water wolllld 
destroy water's usef'ulness.. Most economies are f'ortunate 
that policymakers can not destroy the .fung:ibility o.f :financial. 
instruments through various credit controls.. The main impact 
of these controls is to increase the costs o.f maintaining 
fungibility; e.g. the .farmer who is :forced to truce a loan 
in-kind, in the .form of' bags of' .fertilizer, resells that .fer-
tilizer and buys those things that he really needs or wants. 
Financial intermediation should play an immportant role in 
rural development in any country. Policymakers ought to .focus 
on improving and strengt~ening the process of' .financial inter-
mediation rather than trying to :finesse the f'ungibility o:f 
finance. Interest rate restrictions and credit controls are 
part of the problem not part of the solution. Recent events 
in low income countries·ought to give the U.S. clear insights 
into how financial marke.ts react in rural areas under the on-
slaughts of infl~tion. 
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